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Some evolutionary psychologists claim that humans are good at creating superstimuli, and that many 
pleasure technologies are detrimental to our reproductive fitness. Most of the evolutionary 
psychological literature makes use of some version of Lorenz and Tinbergen‘s largely embryonic 
conceptual framework to make sense of supernormal stimulation and bias exploitation in humans. 
However, the early ethological concept ―superstimulus‖ was intimately connected to other erstwhile 
core ethological notions, such as the innate releasing mechanism, sign stimuli and the fixed action 
pattern, notions that nowadays have, for the most part, been discarded by ethologists. The purpose of 
this paper is twofold. First, we will reconnect the discussion of superstimuli in humans with more 
recent theoretical ethological literature on stimulus selection and supernormal stimulation. This will 
allow for a reconceptualisation of evolutionary psychology‘s formulation of (supernormal) stimulus 
selection in terms of domain-specificity and modularity. Second, we will argue that bias exploitation 
in a cultural species differs substantially from bias exploitation in non-cultural animals. We will 
explore several of those differences, and explicate why they put important constraints on the use of the 
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In 2006, the Edge Foundation asked several people in the arts and sciences for a short piece 
about their ―dangerous idea‖. In his contribution, the evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey 
Miller suggested an original solution for the Fermi paradox: the contradiction between the 
high probability of the existence of extraterrestrial intelligence and the lack of contact with 
civilized aliens. Miller postulated that it is quite likely that intelligent aliens do not come and 
visit us because they are just too busy having fun with computer games and pornography. In 
that respect, they are just like us. Miller writes:  
 
I suspect that a certain period of fitness-faking narcissism is inevitable after any 
intelligent life evolves. This is the Great Temptation for any technological species — 
to shape their subjective reality to provide the cues of survival and reproductive 
success without the substance. Most bright alien species probably go extinct gradually, 
allocating more time and resources to their pleasures, and less to their children. (Miller 
2006)  
 
Maybe Miller‘s idea is a dangerous one. The kernel of the idea, however, is not new. Many 
evolutionary psychologists and, before them, (human) ethologists have developed a similar 
line of reasoning. Steven Pinker, for instance, argues that a great deal of human culture, 
including most of the arts, can be seen as what he calls ―cheesecake for the mind‖. In his 
view, the arts, pornography and strawberry cheesecake are all superstimuli:  
 
We enjoy strawberry cheesecake, but not because we evolved a taste for it. We 
evolved circuits that gave us trickles of enjoyment from the sweet taste of ripe fruit, 
the creamy mouth feel of fats and oils from nuts and meat, and the coolness of fresh 
water. Cheesecake packs a sensual wallop unlike anything in the natural world 
because it is a brew of megadoses of agreeable stimuli which we concocted for the 
express purpose of pressing our pleasure buttons. (Pinker 1997, 524)  
 
Both Pinker and Miller claim that humans are good at creating superstimuli, and that such 
pleasure technologies are detrimental to our reproductive fitness. And while at least a part of 
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their claim seems plausible, many problems lurk behind the use of the superstimulus-idea in 
the evolutionary social sciences. This paper will criticize the use of the superstimulus-idea in 
evolutionary psychology and related disciplines. We do not deny that the superstimulus-
concept can substantially enrich our understanding of human behavior. However, a fruitful 
and scientifically warranted application requires both (1) more conceptual clarity and detail 
than is currently available, and (2) acknowledging that our species is profoundly cultural. The 
first section looks at the development of the superstimulus-idea. The second section discusses 
and criticizes the use of superstimulus-theory in evolutionary psychology. In the third section, 
we construct a detailed, but nevertheless workable, taxonomy of superstimuli for the 
evolutionary social sciences, solving at least some of the problems associated with the 
evolutionary psychology approach. The fourth section explores to what extent humans and 
other profoundly cultural beings from elsewhere in the universe are vulnerable to exploitation 
by superstimuli.  
 
The Tinbergen experiment and its interpretations  
 
Early theories of ethology focused on fixed action patterns (FAPs). A FAP was defined as an 
indivisible sequence of innate behaviours that (1) can be produced in all normal individuals of 
a single species, and (2) once started cannot be stopped until the entire action sequence is 
completed. Lorenz saw FAPs as unlearned actions activated by innate releasing mechanisms 
(IRMs) that were thought to occur in response to key stimuli. 
 
Animals not only react to key stimuli, but also to modifications of key stimuli. Usually, 
modifications lead to a weaker response, but certain new stimuli can cause an increase 
responding. In a series of now classical experiments, Tinbergen discovered that exaggerated 
versions of key stimuli sometimes produce stronger reactions than the natural key stimuli.  
 
In the early 1920s, Oskar Heinroth, the father of comparative behavioral biology, had already 
observed that Herring Gull chicks often peck at a variety of red objects (Tinbergen 1948). 
According to Tinbergen, the redness of these objects was a key stimulus, stimulating a 
begging response in the Herring Gull chick. He correlated the red spot on the Herring Gull‘s 
yellow bill with the chick‘s feeding. In general, the outcome of the pecking at the contrasted 
spot is that the chick finds the food in the parent‘s bill. However, in some cases, for instance 
when the red object is a rubber shoe sole, pecking at red objects does not result in finding 
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food. With his student Ab Perdeck, Tinbergen set up several experiments to test the 
hypothesis that objects similar to the key stimulus could activate the FAP. They presented 
chicks with various painted carton dummies of a Herring Gull‘s head. Every time a model 
was presented, a student simulated the call normally given by a parent-bird. The dummy was 
then held in front of the chick for thirty seconds, and the number of pecking reactions 
counted.  
 
One model was a three-dimensional, accurately shaped and colored model of the parent-gull‘s 
head and beak. Another was an accurate model of the bill only. A third model was a thin red 
rod with three sharply edged white bands at its tip, a very inaccurate representation of the 
adult gull‘s head. The rod contained more red, more color contrast, and was much more 
elongated. Nevertheless, this highly artificial stimulus (stimuli) received about 25% more 
pecks from the gull chicks than the other models (and the natural head). Tinbergen called the 
rod a superstimulus (Tinbergen & Perdeck 1950).  
 
Tinbergen was not particularly happy with the results of this experiment (Kruuk 2003). He 
implicitly assumed that the behavior of animals is highly adaptive. The fact that the chick 
exhibited a stronger response to an artificial stimulus than to the natural key stimulus seemed 
to contradict that assumption. Yet, instead of changing his assumptions about the adaptive 
value of all animal behaviour, Tinbergen tried to explain away the result by claiming that the 
elongated dummy was in fact an accurate representation of what the chick saw in its natural 
environment (Tinbergen 1951). Tinbergen‘s questionable interpretation of the experiment was 
not followed by other theoreticians (Hailman 1961). Rather, most other ethologists interpreted 
this experiment as showing high discrimination for certain key properties of the original 
stimulus to be more important for the activation of the releasing mechanism than fidelity to 
the original stimulus. This was not only true for the pecking response in the Herring Gull 
chicks, but also applied to many other responses in many other species. Magnus (1958) 
reported that an extra large size of the mate model increases male response in the butterfly 
Argynnis paphia. When an oversized artificial egg was placed into the nests of 
Oystercatchers, these birds preferred it to a normal sized egg, even though they were unable to 
brood the artificial egg because of its large size (Tinbergen 1951).  
 
Why do some animals respond more to a superstimulus that neither they nor their forbearers 
have ever seen than to the natural stimuli? Several answers have been given to this question. 
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They can be split up into two (rough) categories: some have argued that (1) the reaction is a 
learning effect; others hold that (2) the tendency to react stronger to more discriminative 
features is innate. Among the learning-effect explanations, the peak shift (Hansson 1959) is 
certainly the best known and most popular in the scientific literature. The peak shift is a 
displacement in the mode of a post-discrimination stimulus generalization gradient away from 
its expected location. When an animal has learned to distinguish between a positive stimulus 
(a stimulus correlated with reinforcement) and a negative stimulus (a stimulus correlated with 
extinction) lying on the same stimulus dimension, the animal will maximally respond in a 
new experiment, not to the original positive stimulus, but to a stimulus further from the 
negative stimulus. Peak shifts occur when the discrimination is learned with errors, making 
the negative stimulus an aversive one. In such cases, the peak shift is a shift away from an 
aversive stimulus (Terrace 1966). In the innate category, almost all explanations tend to see 
the stronger response to superstimuli as the effect of recognition system biases. Such biases 
may be adaptive. Engelmann (1970) suggests that the preference for certain superoptimal 
stimuli enhance male and female mate orientation in some insects, for example, the butterfly 
Argynnis paphia. However, even if the innate perception biases are generally adaptive in the 
natural environment (e.g., when the biggest mates are usually the fittest ones) that does not 
mean that these biases cannot be exploited. Nearly every experiment on superstimuli has done 
just that. Even in the selective environment, exploitation of the biases occurs. Many animals 
produce superstimuli to manipulate the signal-receiver in such a way that the response of the 
signal-receiver is detrimental for the inclusive fitness of the signal-receiver and beneficial for 
the signal-sender‘s inclusive fitness (Dawkins & Krebs 1978). Lack notes, for example, that 
the cuckoo chick  
 
with its huge gape and loud begging call, has evidently evolved in exaggerated form 
the stimuli which elicit the feeding response of parent passerine birds. [...] This, like 
lipstick in the courtship of mankind, demonstrates successful exploitation by means of 
a ―super-stimulus‖. (Lack 1968, as quoted by Atran 2006, 306)  
 
As far as Tinbergen‘s findings are concerned, the second innate option seems closest to his 
thinking. He shared Lorenz‘s conviction that FAPs were triggered by innate releasing 
mechanisms. They both held that the innate releasing mechanisms remained largely 




Superstimuli and maladaptive behavior in evolutionary psychology  
 
Tinbergen‘s theory of superstimuli is widely known in the community of behavioral 
ecologists, but only rarely used. Some evolutionary social scientists, however, do invoke 
superstimuli quite often to explain human behaviour. This is especially true for evolutionary 
psychologists. Their fondness for the theory probably has two intimately intertwined 
explanations. First, they are interested in maladaptive behavior. Inasmuch as, (a) the 
superstimuli differ from the original key stimuli, and (b) the responses to the superstimuli are 
exaggerated, superstimuli form a source of maladaptive behavior. Other evolutionary social 
sciences, like human behavioral ecology, tend to be less interested in maladaptive behavior, 
which may explain why they ignore the superstimulus-theory altogether. Second, evolutionary 
psychologists see the cultural environment as the factor responsible for many if not most of 
our species‘s maladaptive thinking and behavior. Because the superstimuli Tinbergen and his 
collaborators used were artifacts (the stick, the plaster egg, etc.), evolutionary psychologists 
seem to think that Tinbergen‘s experiments may be one of the keys to a deeper understanding 
of our own maladaptive reactions to artifacts. Dual inheritance theorists share the evolutionary 
psychological view that maladaptive behavior should be an important target of evolutionary 
approaches to human behavior, but since they think that cultural transmission biases – and not 
the cultural environment as such – are the prime culprits for human maladaptive behavior, 
superstimuli are almost completely absent from their explanatory framework. 
 
Before we further investigate the actual use of the superstimulus-idea in evolutionary 
psychology, we have to point out that no evolutionary psychologist actually thinks that 
superstimuli are the only factors causing maladaptive behavior. In evolutionary psychology, 
the encompassing explanatory model for widespread maladaptive behavior is a mismatch-
model. Evolutionary psychologists claim that the ―Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptedness‖ (EEA) differs substantially from the modern cultural environment. As a result, 
we are much better at solving the sort of problems our hunter-gatherer ancestors faced than 
the problems we encounter in modern cities. This mismatch model consists of three 
submodels or hypotheses. First, our modern environment probably frustrates many of our 
deep-seated evolved needs: ―If we are to understand the psychiatric disorders from which our 
contemporaries suffer, then we have to take into account the ways in which Western society 
frustrates the needs of paleolithic men or women still persisting as living potential within us 
in our present environmental circumstances.‖ (Stevens & Price 2000, 35). Second, many of 
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the adaptive problems that we currently face were not adaptive problems on the East African 
savannahs in the Pleistocene.
1
 We do not fear guns the way we fear snakes, even though guns 
pose a much greater threat to our fitness today than snakes do (Öhman & Mineka 2001, cf. 
also Blanchette 2006). Third, some objects or events in our cultural environment resemble 
objects or events from our ancestors‘ environment. These modern objects or events trigger the 
reactions that evolved as adaptive responses to the Pleistocene objects and events. The 
problem is that the new entities also differ from the old entities in some respects. These 
differences mean that the same reaction that was adaptive in the Pleistocene is now 
maladaptive. 
  
Obviously, the superstimulus-theory is especially important for the third claim. Moreover, the 
third claim may be identical to the idea that humans are not immune to the powers of 
superstimuli. To decide whether or not this is the case, one must review the ways the theory 
has been applied to humans.  
 
Superstimuli are most often invoked to explain our interest in art or art-like objects. Already 
in the 1960s and 1970s, several art theorists adopted the notions of superstimulus and 
supernormal releasers to account for the phenomenon of aesthetic excitement (see, e.g., Coss 
1968, Behrens & Whitson 1976). Contemporary evolutionary psychologists place themselves 
in this tradition when they claim that visual arts, music, and literature are for humans what big 
plaster eggs are for geese and elongated sticks with red dots are for Herring Gulls. 
Ramachandran has put it this way:  
 
For instance, a gull chick will beg for food by pecking at the red spot on its mother‘s 
long yellow beak. Niko Tinbergen found that a long stick with three red stripes on it is, 
paradoxically, much more effective at stimulating fervent begging than a beak, even 
though it does not resemble one. Such ultranormal stimuli must excite beak-detecting 
visual neurons in the chick's brain more powerfully than an actual beak does, because 
of certain accidental features of these neurons‘ wiring (perhaps embodying the rule 
―the more red contour the better‖). So if gulls had art galleries, they might hang this 
abstract pattern on the wall, worship it, pay millions of dollars for it (even call it a 
                                                          
1
 Human behavioural ecologists tend to be very sceptical about the three submodels, but are especially critical 
about the claim that humans are unable to solve new problems because they are prisoners of their evolved 
adaptations to past environment (Irons 1998).  
8 
 
Picasso), yet not understand why – given that the strange pattern doesn‘t even 
resemble anything. I would argue that the same situation holds for nonrealistic or 
semi-abstract art that we humans enjoy. (Ramachandran 2004, 780) 
 
In much the same way, the neurobiologist Semir Zeki suggested that Mondrian‘s highly 
abstract paintings exploit the perceptual processes in certain areas of the visual cortex, 
eventually leading to an evaluation of beauty (Zeki 1999). According to others, the same 
reasoning may hold for literature and music. The musicologist Knobloch believes that music 
causes pleasurable sensations, partly because it imitates evolutionary programmed releasers 
such as laughter and human voices, ―possibly as supernormal stimuli‖ (Knobloch 1995/2000). 
In general, Steven Pinker endorses this idea, although he seems to be rather reluctant with 
regard to the examples given by Zeki and Ramachandran. Modern and postmodern art is 
clearly not his cup of tea: Pinker interprets the sneering of contemporary artists  at the 
bourgeoisie as ―a sophomoric grab at status with no claim to moral or political virtue.‖ 
Twentieth century art is, in his view, the result of ―a militant denial of human nature. Our 
legacy is ugly, baffling, and insulting art.‖ (Pinker 2003, 416) However, real art, i.e., what 
qualifies as beautiful art in Pinker‘s view, is most probably a matter of code breaking: real 
artists intuitively know what the human pleasure buttons are, and they master the techniques 
to paint, compose or write down the material necessary to push these buttons even harder than 
the naturally occurring key stimuli. 
 
Of course, the use of superstimuli-theory in the evolutionary social sciences is not restricted to 
art. Almost all aspects of culture have been linked to superstimuli. In the early (and highly 
speculative) days of human sociobiology, Desmond Morris mentioned gymnastics, beds 
(―supernormal beds‖), perfume, and even the sporran (furry wallet) of the Scottish kilt as 
supernormal stimuli (Morris 1969). Nowadays, relying on superstimuli-theory is a common 
strategy if more adaptationist accounts of human culture fall short. This point is illustrated by 
the fact that the superstimulus-concept appears to play an important role in certain 
evolutionary psychologically inspired (by-product) explanations of religion and religious 
behavior (Boyer 2001, Sperber & Hirschfeld 2006). For instance, after having stated that 
―[h]umans habitually ‗fool‘ their own innate releasing programs‖, Scott Atran goes on to 
hypothesize that ―supernatural agents are readily conjured up perhaps because natural 
selection has tripwired cognitive schema for agency detection in the face of uncertainty‖ 




In short, the superstimulus-concept often appears to be invoked in a rather casual, perhaps 
even almost obligatory fashion, without much concern for its further theoretical development. 
An exception to this would certainly be Dan Sperber‘s well-known conceptual elaboration of 
the notions of different domains of psychological modules (Sperber 1996, Sperber & 
Hirschfeld 2006). Closely related to the aforementioned evolutionary psychological mismatch 
hypothesis, or at least to what we hold to be its third sub-claim – some objects or events in our 
cultural environment resemble objects or events from our ancestors‘ environment, triggering 
reactions that evolved as adaptive responses to the Pleistocene objects and events – he 
suggests that a module‘s proper domain be distinguished from its actual (and cultural) 
domain(s). Sperber‘s views on the relations between these different domains provide us with a 
first model of how to make sense of superstimuli in the context of human behavior. In the 
following section, we discuss and elaborate several of such models, including Sperber‘s.  
 
Different approaches to supernormal stimulus selection  
 
There appear to be different ways in which the occurrence of supernormal stimulation can be 
conceptualized. Most of the evolutionary psychological literature addressed above makes use 
of some version of Lorenz and Tinbergen‘s largely embryonic conceptual framework and its 
accompanying classical examples and experiments. The early ethological concept, 
―superstimulus‖, was of course intimately connected to other erstwhile core ethological 
notions, such as the innate releasing mechanism, sign stimuli and the fixed action pattern – 
notions which nowadays have, for the most part, been discarded by ethologists, or at any rate 
appear to go unused by most of them.  
 
This is all the more reason for concern given that, as stated by Richard Burkhardt, perhaps 
ethology‘s foremost historian, ―[o]ne striking feature of ethology‘s history is that the ideas 
that constituted the conceptual core of classical ethology were relatively short lived‖ 
(Burkhardt 2005, 15). Likewise, already twenty years ago, Bateson and Klopfer took ―the 
view that ethology as a coherent body of theory ceased to exist in the 1950s. […] One by one 
the concepts and theories succumbed to critical analysis and, by the beginning of the 1960s, 
any vestiges of common belief in an ethological theory of behavior had disappeared‖ (Bateson 
& Klopfer 1989, vi). Even so, and notwithstanding Tinbergen‘s own cautious remarks that 
―[t]he full significance of the phenomenon of ‗supernormal‘ sign stimuli is not yet clear. A 
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closer study might well be worthwhile‖ (Tinbergen 1951, 46), a lot of evolutionary minded 
human behavioral scientists nowadays seem content to apply these ideas, implicitly or 
explicitly, in their work. This seems true even for Sperber, even though, as we shall see, his 
conceptual framework is by far the best explicated one.  
 
The purpose of the present section is to reconnect the discussion of superstimuli in humans 
with more recent, mainly theoretical, ethological literature on stimulus selection and 
supernormal stimulation. The problem of supernormal stimuli may be approached as 
pertaining to the more general problem of ―generalization‖ or, in the wordings of Ghirlanda 
and Enquist (2003, 15), the question of ―how animals respond to sets of stimuli including 
familiar and novel stimuli‖, or perhaps more specifically, ―how an animal will react to novel 
stimuli that are somewhat different from familiar ones, to which the animal‘s reactions are 
known‖ (Ghirlanda 2002, 389). It is interesting to note that these authors stress the relative 
neglect of this topic in both recent ethology and psychology, and connect it explicitly to the 
phenomenon of supernormal stimulation (Ghirlanda 2002; Ghirlanda & Enquist 1999). 
Taking inspiration from this literature, we suggest the concept of biases in the psychological 
makeup of the receiver of a stimulus or combination of stimuli, and their possible 
exploitation, as an overarching category within which to address superstimuli. Within this 
overarching category of biases, a first distinction can be introduced between functional and 
non-functional biases. As we will see, this will allow for a reconceptualization of Sperber‘s 
formulation of (supernormal) stimulus selection in terms of domain-specificity and 
modularity.  
 
Functional biases  
 
The very notion of a module coming equipped with its proper domain entails that said module 
evolved as an adaptation to certain domain-specific problems. The proper domain of a 
cognitive module is ―all the information that it is the module‘s biological function to process‖ 
(Sperber 1996, 136, cf., also Sperber & Hirschfeld 2006, 157 for a recent and somewhat 
different articulation). For instance, the proper domain of a face recognition module would be 
natural faces. Cultural artifacts, such as masks, would belong to the actual domain of this 
module if they meet the module‘s input conditions. However, masks would not belong to its 
proper domain, even though they would stimulate the mechanism, because this mechanism 
was not designed by natural selection to recognize masks. The relationships between a 
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module‘s proper and actual domain that we are interested in here can then take on at least one 
of the two following forms: mismatches between domains, and mismatches of domains.  
 
Mismatches between domains, or stimulus variations along rearrangement dimensions  
 
Novel stimulus configurations satisfying the input conditions of a module, hence pertaining to 
its actual domain, do not necessarily belong to the proper domain of the module. Indeed, this 
often appears to be the case. Religious representations, or more specifically cases of 
supernaturalism, are often treated as paradigmatic of this type of supernormal stimulation. 
According to Sperber and Hirschfeld (2006, 164):  
 
Representations of supernatural beings […] spread and stabilize in different cultures 
because they act for one or several cognitive modules as superstimuli. Unlike other 
superstimuli, which have some features exaggerated while essential features are 
maintained, these cultural superstimuli typically combine exaggerated and paradoxical 
features with ordinary and essential ones. One way they may be paradoxical is in 
falling simultaneously in the actual domain of two different modules.  
 
Rather than using the distinction between proper and actual domains of modules, Ghirlanda 
and Enquist introduced, admittedly in a markedly different context, the notion of dimensions 
along which stimuli can vary (Ghirlanda & Enquist 2003). This notion of stimulus dimensions 
lends itself to expressing ideas quite similar to the ones envisaged by Sperber and Hirschfeld, 
even though neither author pair refers to the other in their respective work on the subject of 
supernormal stimulation. Nor, for that matter, has this connection, to our knowledge, been 
made by other authors working in this area.  
 
The basic dichotomy presented by Enquist and Ghirlanda involves, on one hand, (qualitative) 
variations along rearrangement dimensions (such as object shape, orientation or location), 
taking into account how an amount of stimulation is distributed among the receptors of the 
sense organs involved, and, on the other hand, (quantitative) variations along intensity 
dimensions (such as intensity of sound, light or chemical concentration), referring to the total 
activation of these receptors.  
Mismatches between the proper and actual domains of modules could be interpreted as often 
involving (mere) variations along rearrangement dimensions of the stimuli, causing some 
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input to meet some module‘s actual input conditions. Ghirlanda and Enquist‘s research 
suggests that, while response biases or stronger responses towards other stimuli than the 
originally existing ones do occur, this is far from always being the case. Phenomena like 
supernaturalism may involve both mismatches between proper and actual domains (in Sperber 
and Hirschfeld‘s terminology) and variations along rearrangement dimensions of the relevant 
stimuli (in Ghirlanda and Enquist‘s terminology). This is not to say, however, that they are 
necessarily appropriately called superstimuli, since actual response biases are relatively rarer 
along such rearrangement dimensions than they are in other cases, as, for example, we shall 
show with the case treated in the next subsection. Moreover, as shown in an obviously highly 
idealized fashion in the figure below, Ghirlanda and Enquist‘s meta-analysis of experimental 
data suggests that responses to stimuli varying along rearrangement dimensions are usually 
described better by – peaked – bell-shaped or Gaussian curves.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Responses to stimuli as a function of stimulus variations along rearrangement 
dimensions  
 
Possible evolutionary reasons for this relative lack of response biases when dealing with 
stimulus variations along rearrangement dimensions, as well as for the less distinct nature of 
actually occurring response biases in these cases, could include the following. It is for 
instance unclear what open-endedness could possibly be referring to for these types of 
stimulus variations. Intuitively, it seems to make very little sense for an organism to evolve a 
bias for the most shuffled stimulus configuration in a certain domain, given that there will 
rarely be anything resembling a straightforward positive correlation between the amount of 
stimulus rearrangement and the adaptive value of preferentially or more forcefully reacting to 
the rearranged stimulus variant. Generally speaking, there appears to be little reason why the 
mere shuffling of the various elements constituting a complex stimulus configuration would 
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inexorably lead to preferences, exaggerated or not, for thus shuffled stimulus variants. At the 
very least, as we will see in the next subsection, there are better reasons to believe why such 
preferences are more likely to arise when confronted with mismatches of domains, or perhaps 
better, stimulus variations along intensity dimensions.  
 
Mismatches of domains, or stimulus variations along intensity dimensions  
 
Another case, to some extent perhaps also envisaged by Sperber (2007), would consist in the 
fact that stimuli, even though pertaining to both the proper and the actual domains of a given 
module, are more readily available or stronger in our novel environments than they were 
under the ancestral conditions in which this module evolved. Such, more readily available or 
stronger, stimuli often tend to elicit stronger responses from their receivers, potentially 
leading to maladaptive results. One of the most oft-cited examples of superstimuli with regard 
to human behavior concerns the dangerous human preponderance towards sugar and fat (see, 
e.g., Symons 1979). Much of this more recent literature echoes Lorenz‘s views on the subject:  
 
The art of cooking, the competition of chefs catering for the most sophisticated 
gourmets, long ago inspired the invention of supernormal food stuffs, much to the 
detriment of civilized humanity. For our paleolithic ancestors, hungry as they were 
much of the time, it was certainly sound strategy to follow the instructions of IRMs 
telling them what foods to choose: they should contain as much fat as possible, as 
much sugar as possible, and as little roughage as possible. Being ―open on one side,‖ 
these key stimuli led to an extremely unhealthy preference for supernormal objects. 
[…] Even the most complete insight into the workings of our IRMs does not make it 




This second category of biases would seem to correspond more closely to Ghirlanda and 
Enquist‘s second main stimulus dimension, involving variation in the intensity of stimulation. 
While it is acknowledged that the distinction between intensity and non-intensity or 
rearrangement dimensions is in itself insufficient to cover each and every instance of variation 
between often-complex stimulus configurations, it does seem to offer some advantages over 
                                                          
2
 We would like to acknowledge here that the case of modern day humans over-eating sugary or fatty foods is 
not necessarily the best example of supernormal stimulation in action. The reason for over-eating these foods 
may very well lie in the mechanisms that control appetite, rather than in them being preferred because they are 
sweeter or fatter. Nevertheless, given its prevalence in the literature, we have chosen to retain this example.  
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other approaches to stimulus generalization. Whereas Sperber‘s largely implicit classification 
of superstimuli provides little guidance as to when to expect them to occur more prominently, 
Ghirlanda and Enquist‘s taxonomy allows us to predict stronger response biases when 
confronted with stimuli whose supernormal character is due do their intensity. Moreover, 
according to the ethological and psychological literature reviewed by Ghirlanda and Enquist, 
many intensity generalization gradients are monotonic up to a certain threshold (rather than 
peaked, as we saw to be the case for rearrangement gradients). Figure 2 illustrates how 
responses to these types of stimulus variations often tend to increase linearly (up to a certain 
threshold) with the intensity of the stimulation involved.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Responses to stimuli as a function of stimulus variations along intensity 
dimensions  
 
This dovetails quite nicely with Lorenz‘s intuitions about the open-ended nature of certain 
stimuli in general, but has the advantage of being more specific as to why some types of 
stimulus variants tend to exhibit this characteristic more often than others, or are, so to speak, 
more open to open-endedness. Indeed, Ghirlanda and Enquist‘s approach clearly indicates 
which types of stimulus variations are prone to leading to response biases. Again, we can 
speculate about the evolutionary origins of such response biases. What is perhaps the most 
intuitively appealing possible explanation refers mainly to the absence of counter-indications 
against these biases evolving. For example, according to Manning and Dawkins, rules of 
thumb like approach the largest female are adequate and evolve easily simply because false 
positives are rare (Manning & Dawkins 1993). 
  
Obviously, quite a few of the phenomena that are actually labeled as superstimuli will involve 
variations along both intensity and rearrangement dimensions, making it more difficult to 
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assess the usefulness of Ghirlanda and Enquist‘s framework in these cases. Nevertheless, 
some stimulus variations involving changes in both intensity and arrangement, such as the 
aforementioned variations in size, appear to show response biases at least in some respects 




Our final category involves adaptively neutral, or non-functional biases. In their recent 
reaction to Richerson and Boyd‘s Not by Genes Alone, Sperber and Claidière offer a simple 
example for consideration when addressing what Richerson and Boyd call ―content-based 
bias‖ in cultural evolution. When people are simultaneously exposed to two equally 
appreciated jokes, the first of which, however, is harder to remember than the other, they 
plausibly argue that the latter is more likely to spread and become stabilized in the population 
(Sperber & Claidière 2008, 286). In the context that concerns us here, this case could also be 
interpreted as illustrating the workings of a neutral memory bias. Given certain general 
properties of our neuronal circuitry, not directly related to the type of information at hand, 




As such, we believe that this example bears some obvious resemblance to Enquist and Arak‘s 
by-product explanation for the existence of certain types of biases (Arak & Enquist 1993; 
Enquist & Arak 1998). While their neural network modeling results have been criticized by 
other behavioral ecologists (cf., for example, Dawkins & Guilford 1995, and Endler & Basolo 
1998 for a review), it remains plausible that at least some instances of supernormal stimulus 
generalization result from general biases of the sensory system. That is, biases not specifically 
designed by natural selection to solve any (domain-)specific non-sensory adaptive problem. 
According to Enquist and his collaborators, these general properties can nonetheless drive the 
evolution of signal design towards what they call ―hidden preferences‖, among which, again, 
there may be a – hidden – preference for exaggerated stimuli. This last category of 
superstimuli thus stands in no direct relationship with any pre-existing adapted or adaptive 
bias. This might explain why the evolutionary psychological literature on superstimuli 
                                                          
3
 This is obviously not to state that memory as such serves no function; it only means that such function is not, or 
at the very least not necessarily, related to, for example, the adaptive significance of humour. Put differently, 
―non-functional‖ refers to the specific problem under scrutiny, not to the absence of any function at all. 
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neglects it. However, Enquist et al.‘s theoretical framework leaves ample room for such a 
category.  
 
To conclude this section, we argue that the incorporation of recent ethological theorizing on 
the phenomena of superstimuli and bias exploitation can lead to a considerable refinement of 
the existing conceptual framework of supernormal stimulation in humans. Sperber and his 
colleagues (Hirschfeld and Atran) may have aimed at a similar refinement when they tried to 
connect supernormal stimuli with some key notions of evolutionary psychology‘s massive 
modularity framework, such as domain specificity, proper domain, and actual domain. 
However, we find our approach to be preferable for several reasons. First, the domain-
specificity of (all) our mental processing systems is far from certain (Currie & Sterelny 2000). 
Second, the distinction between the actual and the proper domain of a function is explicitly 
inspired by the distinction between actual (or weak) and proper functions, elaborated by 
Millikan, Neander and other etiological theorists of biological function. However, this 
etiological theory has many problematic features (Wouters 2005), some of which have a 
bearing on the distinction at stake here. This is particularly true for the problem of functional 
indeterminacy (or, more precisely, the problem of the extensionality of natural selection): 
only denying (or neglecting) natural selection‘s extensionality can result in the distinction 
between the actual and the proper domain of a module. The validity of Sperber‘s claim that 
the proper domain of our face-recognition module is to recognize natural faces (and not 
masks) depends on the assumption that the only possible description of the module is that of a 
‗face-recognizing device‘. Following Fodor (1996), we believe that this assumption is at least 
partially unwarranted, as, according to Sperber, the content ―natural faces‖ was co-extensional 
with the content ―face-like objects such as masks and natural faces‖ in the environment in 
which humans evolved. Third, Sperber‘s proposal tends to obfuscate the prefix ―super‖ in 
―superstimulus‖. In the evolutionary psychological(ly) inspired literature, the superstimulus-
concept tends to be used indiscriminately to designate the workings of the three categories of 
biases we distinguished in this section. Our analysis, however, suggests a more restricted 
usage of the term superstimulus which seems more in line with its original formulation in the 
ethological literature: restricted to cases involving actual response biases. Fourth, trying to 
bring the discussion on superstimuli in the human evolutionary social sciences under the 
general heading of biases and their possible exploitation would probably extend more easily 
into the existing literature on the role and significance of (other) psychological biases in 
cultural evolution (see, e.g., Sperber & Claidière 2008; Richerson & Boyd 2005). However, 
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even though we believe our refined conceptual framework offers significant advantages, it is 
not without problems of its own. As we explain in the next section, most of these problems 
are related to the aforementioned phenomenon of cultural evolution.  
 
The problem with humans  
 
Humans are a cultural species. This raises the question how being a cultural species is likely 
to affect the exploitation of our biases. Some evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Pinker 1997) 
suggest that, thanks to our general and social intelligence, language, our capacity to plan, and 
our imaginative capacities, humans are simply better than other species in manipulating 
conspecifics (Mithen 1996, Carruthers 2006). At some point in the course of our hominid 
lineage, these basic abilities – abilities we do not share with most of our primate relatives – 
may have been culturally exapted to create misleading cues of survival and reproductive 
success that nonetheless meet the input conditions of the mind‘s processing systems.  
 
We do not want to question the claim that humans are particularly good at creating 
superstimuli. In fact, Carruthers‘s convincing evolutionary account of our creative cognition 
(Carruthers 2006) provides an important building block towards an encompassing theory of 
bias exploitation in humans and human culture. Nevertheless, his evolutionary account of 
human creativity, convincing as it may be, cannot be the encompassing theory itself. Apart 
from our (supposedly) spectacular capacity to exploit the biases of conspecifics, there are 
many other differences in bias exploitation between our species and other species. Most of 
these differences have to do with culture. In this section, we will explore these differences and 
explicate why they put important constraints on the use of the superstimulus-concept, be it a 
coarse or a nuanced one, in the evolutionary social sciences.  
 
Strategic and non-strategic exploitation  
 
Much of the research and theorizing about the exploitation of sensory and cognitive biases is 
done in the context of sexual selection.
4
 In the sensory bias model of sexual selection, a 
                                                          
4
 It is interesting to note that Lorenz apparently disliked the theory of sexual selection, and saw his concept of the 
releaser as a valid alternative. Or, in Burkhardt‘s (2005, 169) wording: ―Finding the idea of sexual selection 
repugnant, he was happy to account for the majority of secondary sexual characters in other terms. As he saw it, 
the majority of conspicuous structures, colors, sounds, and behavior patterns in animals served as releasers of 
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female preference for a male trait is seen as the result of biases in the sensory system of the 
female, a system that existed prior to the evolution of the preferred male trait (Andersson 
1994, Ryan & Rand 1990). Most studies done on sensory exploitation outside the sexual 
selection context concern interspecies deception by means of signal imitation (Dawkins & 
Krebs 1979). The begging calls of the cuckoo chick, for example, imitate the calls of an entire 
brood of the host species, thus eliciting (or exploiting) the childcare behavior of the host 
parents (Davies et al. 1998). Deception within and between species has in common that one 
party is duped, while the other party benefits from exploiting the bias. Although some have 
argued that a dupe is not needed for exploitation (e.g., Dawkins & Guilford 1996), there 
seems to be no exploitation at all if no one profits from it.  
 
In short, bias exploitation in animals occurs most often in a strategic context. But, is this also 
true for ―bias exploitation‖ in humans? Is the human receiver always duped? And, does the 
human sender always benefit?  
 
Who benefits?  
 
The above-mentioned example of cooking and sugar overconsumption illustrates that it may 
remain unclear who benefits from an alleged deception. To tackle this problem, one might 
initially suggest that it is obviously the cook (or the candy-producer) who benefits. This 
solution, however, is not completely satisfactory for several reasons. Foremost, the cook‘s 
cooking seems more beneficial to his wallet than his reproductive success. But, in the animal 
ecology literature on sensory exploitation, only benefits in terms of reproductive fitness count 
as real benefits. Furthermore, the cook will perhaps often prepare exquisite, but not 
necessarily nutritious, dishes for himself. His benefit then is pleasure, but this short-term 
benefit is essentially an evolutionary cost. 
  
Of course, this difference between sensory exploitation in humans and sensory exploitation in 
other animals should not be exaggerated. Self-exploitation through sensory biases via extra-
corporal artifacts is not a unique human behavior. Male fiddler crabs are themselves attracted 
by the mounds of sand they build to attract females (Ribeiro et al. 2006). Inversely, humans 
do use sensory exploitation in strategic contexts: make-up and high heels are often seen as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
social reactions in fellow members of the species and had furthermore evolved for this purpose.‖ We will not, 
however, further pursue this particular aspect of early ethological theorizing here.  
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superstimuli used by women to attract men (Frank 2007). Still, we think it is important to 
stress that very often the only beneficiary of sensory exploitation is the cultural artifact or the 
cultural practice itself. This is rarely seen in nonhuman animals. It seems quite likely that this 
difference is due to the difference between cultural and natural functions (Richerson & Boyd 
2005, 165).  
 
Who is the dupe? 
 
When evolutionary psychologists and other evolutionary social scientists write about 
superstimuli, the ―dupe‖ is always easy to identify: we, humans, are supposed to be misled by 
cultural artifacts, because these artifacts are or contain exaggerated sensory signals. However, 
one should be cautious about underwriting this claim for at least three important reasons. The 
first problem is that many of the cultural products labeled as detrimental superstimuli are 
actually nothing of the sort, but rather stimuli that enhance the receiver‘s fitness. Carroll, for 
example, criticizes Pinker and others (like Ramachandran) who see art as a complex of 
superstimuli. According to Carroll, art is most likely an adaptation:  
 
If we compare the effects of music with those of recreational drugs, we can begin to 
understand the mistaken direction Pinker‘s theory has taken. Drugs are disorienting 
and demoralizing. If young people use them habitually, they become incapable of 
adapting to the demands of a complex environment. Music has no such deleterious 
effect. More importantly, it seems very likely that people raised with no exposure to 
music, art, or literature would be psychologically and emotionally stunted, that they 
would be only marginally capable of developing in normal ways. They would 
probably have great difficulty learning to deal with their own emotions or to relate to 
other people with any sensitivity and flexibility. Their capacity for responding in 
creative ways to the demands of a complex and changing cultural environment would 
probably be severely impaired. (Carroll 1998, 481)  
 
On this view, music, literature, and painting can still be exaggerated signals, but it would be a 
mistake to say that they exploit our biases. Actually, it is not inconceivable that they even 
have more beneficial results (for the receiver) than the natural stimuli for whose processing 
the biases were initially designed by natural or sexual selection. The open-endedness of such 
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biases should then be thought of as an adaptive byproduct, and not as a maladaptive or 
functionally neutral one.  
 
The second problem is that of the supposedly addictive character of real superstimuli. Are we 
really as vulnerable to bias exploitation as some evolutionary psychologists suggest? Or, has 
our evolution as a cultural species led to defenses against such forms of exploitation? As 
Carroll notes, art is not as addictive as heroin or even cheesecake, so it seems inappropriate to 
call literature ―cheesecake for the mind‖. Yet, at the same time, one should not forget that 
heroin and cheesecake are not equally addictive for everyone. The psychological literature on 
addiction mentions two correlated factors to account for inter-individual differences. The first 
is variation in our biases. The second is variation in our capacity for self-control. This second 
factor entails that most humans are not simple pleasure machines. Yes, we do have ―pleasure 
buttons‖ that can be pushed by artifacts, mental representations and natural stimuli, but our 
biases are seldom so exploited that we become prisoners of these pleasure buttons. This is 
illustrated by Robert Nozick‘s well-known thought experiment, dubbed ―the experience 
machine‖ (Nozick 1974). The experience machine, that Nozick asks us to imagine, can give 
us whatever pleasurable experiences we could possibly want. ―Superduper 
neuropsychologists‖ have figured out a way to stimulate a person‘s brain in order to induce 
any pleasurable experience they may desire. We would not be able to tell that these 
experiences were not caused by the real thing. Then, he asks us, if we were given the choice, 
would we like to plug in or not? Most people, says Nozick, would be unwilling to plug in, 
because we also care about living in contact with reality. Pleasure (or the absence of 
suffering) is not the only thing that matters to us. As a matter of fact, this reluctance in 
relation to the experience machine is not strange. If we are truly a cultural species, chances 
are that cultural superstimuli have been around for quite a long time, probably long enough 
for gene-culture co-evolution to have resulted in a mechanism to counter their detrimental 
effects. In other words, it is quite likely that we have evolved defenses against bias 
exploitation by culture. We are not immune to temptation, but our power to resist this 
temptation is probably stronger than that of other animals (Logue 1988). Moreover, such self-
control is not very domain-specific (Gailliot & Baumeister 2007). Because we are the single 
species that can form beliefs about our own intentional states, the human mind has the ability 
to regulate itself, unlike the minds of other animals (McGeer & Pettit 2002). This means that 
most modern temptations are probably well within the range of self-control. One can conclude 
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that humans are less susceptible to bias exploitation than most evolutionary psychologists 
seem to think. Or, as Boyd and Richerson put it:  
 
[E]nvironments outside the range in which a species has evolved are quite likely to 
result in a miscellany of breakdowns and manipulations. Humans are not the best 
candidates to exemplify such breakdowns, because we are a species that is superbly 
adaptable to variable environments, as our explosive success during the Holocene 
testifies. (Richerson & Boyd 2005, 189)  
 
A third, somewhat related, problem has to do with the fact that humans often actively choose 
to pursue the exploitation of their biases. Most people have long and short-term goals. Among 
those short-term goals, pleasure normally ranks high. It goes without saying that we 
sometimes prefer short-term superstimulation to happiness in the long-term. One could claim 
that, in such cases, we succumb to the temptation presented by the superstimuli. However, 
unlike other animals, humans sometimes also choose to be fooled or manipulated by cultural 
superstimuli. We go to the theatre and the movies, knowing that what we are going to see is 
not real. Superstimulus enthusiasts would perhaps argue that this underscores their point: 
superstimuli are tempting to the point of being irresistible, even despite our knowing, in some 
cases, that they are not real. However, we believe that this is simply incorrect. What it 
actually shows is that we sometimes decide that it does not matter to us all that much that we 
are being manipulated. As our self-regulating mind can intentionally seek to discover what is 
real and what is not, a desire for fun can lead it intentionally not to pursue such questions 
(McGeer & Pettit 2002). Something like intentional self-deception is unlikely to occur in 
other animals, but its occurrence in humans is undisputed (Mele 1987). Gombrich (2000, 87) 
correctly notes that humans ―are not simple slot machines which begin to tick when coins are 
dropped into us, for, unlike the stickleback, we have what psychoanalysts call an ‗ego‘ which 
tests reality and shapes the impulses from the id. And so we can remain in control while we 
half-surrendered to counterfeit coins, to symbols and substitutes.‖ Obviously, we are well 
aware of the fact that psychological experiments find that we are less in control than we think 
we are (Saad 2007). But, that does not detract from the point that, despite considerable inter-
individual variation, most of us are to a large degree in control of what we do, even if what we 





Innate and learned biases  
 
Traditionally, the ethological literature attached a great deal of importance to purported 
differences between innate and learned behavioral patterns. Lorenz, for instance, writes:  
 
[T]he IRM cannot do what is so easily done by our learned gestalt perception, that is, 
respond selectively to complex qualities. It is an extremely reliable rule of thumb that 
an IRM can be assumed to be at work whenever an organism is ―taken in‖ by a very 
simple dummy or model. Conversely, if the attempt to elicit a certain response by a 
dummy fails, and it proves necessary to simulate a biologically relevant stimulus 
situation in all its details in order to release a response, or if even this proves to be 
impossible, the assumption is justified that the organism has learned to respond to a 




This quote clearly shows that Lorenz‘ account of innateness refers to a cluster of several 
properties. On his view, IRMs are innate because they are (a) not learned, and (b) highly 
environmentally canalized. As others have argued (e.g. Bateson & Mameli 2007, Mameli 
2008), the inference from highly environmentally canalized to not learned is not always 
warranted. Apart from this philosophical problem, however, there is little or no theoretical 
and empirical support for the idea that stronger responses to superstimuli are generally the 
effect of non-learned recognition system biases. Ghirlanda and Enquist, for example, do not 
appear to find significant differences between the generalization of genetically inherited and 
individually learned behavior in the available data. More specifically, they find no support for 
the (early) ethological claim that biases in genetically inherited behavior are open-ended, 
whereas biases in learned behavior are limited (Ghirlanda & Enquist 2003). 
 
This suggests that the occurrence of superstimuli does not necessarily prove that the 
phenomenon under consideration cannot possibly be the result of learning, contrary to what 
has been and sometimes still is suggested. The fact that superstimuli exist in a given context 
                                                          
5
 This is followed somewhat further on page 172 by the observation that ―[i]t is perfectly conceivable that there 
might be releasers, or stimulus-emitting organizations, the signals of which are not addressed to an IRM but are 
received by learned perceptions, as are the color patterns of our flags. The functions of perception can certainly 
cause the production of signals catering to the properties just described. While there is an abundance of man-
made signals whose properties are clearly dictated by the Prägnanztendenz of human gestalt perception, we 
know only a few examples of phylogenetically programmed stimulus emitters without a corresponding IRM, in 
other words, a releaser the response to which must be learned.‖  
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appears to be compatible with the behavior in question being individually or socio-culturally 
learned.  
 
Mameli calls the incompatibility of learning and innateness ‗the minimal condition‘ which 
any account of innateness must meet (Mameli 2008, 721). But in the discussion on bias 
exploitation, the main focus of the nativist debate is less on this minimal condition, but rather 
on the issue whether or not the bias is (a) a genetically selected adaptation, and (b) a domain-
specific bias. Unfortunately, there is not much space to discuss this issue here in full detail. 
But at least it is important to note that much of the nativist debate in the context of human 
bias exploitation is actually about the adaptiveness and domain specificity of learning 
mechanisms and cultural capacities (Bateson & Mameli 2007, 827). Returning to the 
conceptual framework elaborated by Sperber, who readily acknowledges that ―most innate 
human modules are learning modules‖ (Sperber & Hirschfeld 2006, 157), a distinction could 
be made between source-based psychological biases and content-based psychological biases 
(Sperber & Claidière 2008). Being ―effects of the cognitive mechanisms that construct a 
mental representation on the basis of informational input‖ (Sperber & Claidière 2008, 288), 
content-based biases could very well, depending on their relative open-endedness, be prone to 
supernormal stimulation. However, the ways in which such content-based biases interfere 
with source-based psychological biases (e.g., Boyd and Richerson‘s conformity bias and 
prestige bias), plausibly leading to different cultural evolutionary outcomes, depending on 
their relative importance in any given case, is still very much open to debate (compare, for 
example, Henrich et al. 2008 and Richerson & Boyd 2008 with Sperber & Claidière 2008). 
Following up on our earlier example of the cook, and paraphrasing somewhat Henrich et al. 
(2008, 127), it could, for instance, be argued that the fact that a given novel recipe 
corresponds well with attracting innate taste preferences and/or learned local cuisine styles 
will by no means necessarily guarantee it spreading if, for whatever reason, the cooks 
producing this particular recipe are unlikely to be selected as cultural models. Moreover, the 
source-based psychological biases‘ vulnerability to superstimuli merits further investigation. 
Would, for example, the more extreme cultural role models generate more intense response 
biases under certain circumstances? Or, put differently, to what extent are biases like these 
themselves merely directional, or conversely, rather more open-ended?  
 
Finally, content-based biases are also likely to exhibit different degrees of learnedness. Thus, 
what Sperber and his collaborators refer to as cultural attractors are equally likely to be 
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subject to these differences. Not only can concrete factors of attraction be of a psychological 
or ecological character (Sperber 1996; Sperber & Claidière 2008), they may also quite often 
rely on learning and culturally transmitted preferences, allowing for changes of attractors on 
historical timescales (Claidière & Sperber 2007). Placing the discussion of superstimuli 
within this broader framework is perhaps capable of generating a very different, more 
complete picture than the one traditionally espoused.  
 
 
Conclusion: Are we amusing ourselves to death?  
 
It may be the case that we and other, more or less civilized aliens appear prone to driving 
ourselves to extinction. But, even then, this would not have to mean that the Fermi paradox 
can be resolved simply by appealing to the superstimulus-theory. As we have argued, several 
specificities common to profoundly cultural species would likely preclude them from 
succumbing entirely to the temptations of supernormal stimulation. Obviously, that is not to 
say that humans are completely immunized against the exploitation of their biases. Although 
we have argued that human culture and our evolved cultural capacities probably tend to soften 
or even counter the fitness-detrimental effects of such exploitation, we nonetheless 
acknowledge that culture sometimes has the opposite effect. Why would this be the case? Is it 
because cultural species are simply better at constructing superstimuli than other animals? 
Surely, this seems to be part of the answer. However, we will conclude this paper by arguing 
that fitness-detrimental bias exploitation in our species might also be partially explained by 
the peculiarities of cultural transmission itself.  
 
Our – now globalized – Western culture produces individuals who would rather pursue 
pleasure than maximize their fitness. But this is both historically and cross-culturally quite 
exceptional. In most cultures most people behave in ways that tend to maximize fitness. One 
can safely assume that they are not amusing themselves to extinction. This raises the question 
of why seeking pleasure is (much) more valued in Western culture than in other cultures. 
What happened to the cultural transmission of norms, such that pleasure-seeking has become 
more value than vice?  
 
In a series of papers, Newson and Richerson have argued that many traditional communities 
maintain fitness-maximizing norms because a large proportion of social interaction is between 
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kin. Because kin have an interest in encouraging each other towards higher fitness, their 
implicit and explicit communications are more likely to favor behavior that strongly correlates 
with high fitness (Newson et al. 2007, Newson & Richerson 2009). Conversely, a decrease in 
the frequency of contact between kin leads to a progressive relaxation of norms that 
encourage fitness-maximizing behavior. According to Newson and Richerson, this explains 
the demographic transition and a series of other changes in reproductive behavior (Newson & 
Richerson 2009). Following Durkheim and other social scientists, they believe that with 
industrialization, institutions such as businesses, schools and political systems, begin to 
assume roles and responsibilities that were once the province of the family.  
 
This line of reasoning can easily be applied to cultural differences in bias exploitation. While 
individuals in pre-industrial societies conform to the family values that tend to maximize 
fitness, individuals in industrialized societies are more inclined (a) to develop strong 
preferences of their own, and (b) to act according to those individual preferences. In 
industrialized societies, the fitness-detrimental exploitation of evolved and other biases will 
probably be stronger, not solely because of the large-scale production of superstimuli and the 
rise of a consumption culture (cf. Enquist et al. 2002), but also because industrialization 
reduces the social control of kin. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, this shows that an 
evolutionary psychological approach, focusing on individual preferences and superstimuli, 
may have more predictive and explanatory value in our contemporary industrialized culture 
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